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ABSTRACT 
Safety is the most important factor when developing software for safety-critical systems. Traditional approaches 
attempted to achieve safety through testing the software. However, there might be some bugs in the software not 
revealed in the test procedure. Formal verification is a new trend in developing safe software. In this paper, we 
propose a multi-phase formal approach for safety management in safety-critical software. We use timed transition 
Petri-net as a formal means to specify the properties of the model and their relations in each component of the 
software. In addition, we use the Z language to specify textual and mathematical specifications of the model, as a 
representative model to evaluate the proposed approach; we chose continuous infusion insulin pump (CIIP). 
Keywords: Safety-critical software, hazard, formal languages, CIIP. 
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1. Introduction 
Computers play a significant role in operating many 
modern systems some of which are classified as 
safety-critical. Any failure in safety-critical systems 
may result in loss of life or significant damage to the 
environment. Examples include medical systems, 
aircraft flight control systems, weapons and nuclear 
systems. When designing such systems, which 
usually include both software and hardware, the most 
important factor is safety. In this paper, we focus on 
the design of safety-critical software. 
The main approaches to improve the safety are 
divided into three classes: Theorem proving [1], 
model checking [2] and runtime verification [3]. 
Current safety paradigms usually use one of the 
aforementioned approaches or a combination of 
them. For example, runtime reflection [3] employs 
runtime verification and the approach proposed in 
[4] uses a combination of theorem proving and 
model checking. Safety approaches like timed 
automata [5] and Event-B [6] usually use formal 
methods to specify the system requirements or 
monitor the system behavior. Formal languages 
such as Z [7], is usually used to specify the system. 
For example, the approach proposed in [8] uses a 
combination of Petri-net and the Z language to 
verify medical software.  
However, the main issue with current approaches is 
that they are not taking into consideration all safety 
angles. We believe safety must be observed in all 
software production phases. Therefore, we propose a 
formal approach which takes into account all software 
production phases including planning, requirements 
specification, designing, and implementation [9]. We 
explain the proposed approach step by step using 
continuous infusion insulin pump (CIIP) which is a 
familiar safety-critical system.  
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we 
explain briefly CIIP. In Section 3, we explain the 
steps that must be taken for achieving safety in 
CIIP based on the proposed approach. Finally, 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Continuous infusion insulin pump. 
Diabetes is a disease originated when the human 
body cannot produce enough insulin hormones. 
Insulin metabolizes the available sugar in the blood. 
The known therapy for diabetes consists in injecting 
enough insulin to the patient's blood. High blood 
sugar levels may hurt kidney, heart and eyes. Low 
blood sugar levels may paralyze brain and cause 
diabetic death. CIIP is a modern medical system for 
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controlling the blood sugar levels by injecting the 
adequate doses of insulin to the patient’s blood. This 
system takes blood samples every 10 minutes and 
checks its sugar level. Then the amount of necessary 
insulin is computed for injection in the blood [7]. 
3. The proposed approach 
In this section, we explain our approach in detail 
and use CIIP as an example. Our proposed 
approach consists of three steps as follows: 
Step one: In the first Step, we specify all safety 
requirements. For safety requirements we need to 
investigate the system in detail which includes the 
goals of the system, environments, users, 
operators, and preliminary resources. These goals 
are shown in Table 1 for CIIP.
Goals 
To control sugar level in a diabetic 
patient and to inject automatically the 
correct insulin dose. 
Environment Patient's body 
Users Patient, doctor 
Operators -
Table 1. Preliminary information about CIIP. 
Some of the equipment needed in CIIP are sampling 
and injecting equipment, insulin resource, processor, 
LCD, and warning systems. A high level description 
of CIIP behavior is as follows: The system takes a 
sample of patient blood every 10 minutes, computes 
suitable insulin dose, and injects insulin to the 
patient’s blood. High level safety approach for CIIP is 
depicted in Table 2.
No. Roadmap 
1 Sugar status have to be reported to the patient periodically 
2 Warn to the user before insulin resource gets empty 
3 Warn to the user when power is low 
4 System has not to hurt the patient 
Table 2. Safety approach for CIIP. 
For CIIP, the system requirements consist of real-
time operating systems, some modeling tools, real-
time programming languages and PCs. Hardware 
requirements consist of processors, memories, 
insulin reservoirs, sugar sampling equipment, insulin 
injection equipment, LCDs and power supplies. 
Functional requirements of CIIP are as follows: 
1. The system receives a sample of sugar 
blood every 10 minutes. 
2. The system processes sugar blood and 
computes the sugar level. 
3. The system computes insulin dose 
according to the last three sugar samples 
and injects insulin to the patient’s blood. 
Nonfunctional requirements are usually data 
requirements extracted from medical documents. 
These requirements are the following: 
1. If the sugar level is smaller than the 
minimum value, the insulin dose is 0. 
2. If the sugar level is between the minimum 
and the maximum value, then: 
x If the third sugar sample is smaller or equal 
to the second sample, insulin dose is 0. 
x If the third sugar sample is greater than the 
second sample and the second sample is 
greater than the first one, and the 
difference between the third sample and 
the second one is smaller or equal than the 
difference between the second sample and 
the first one, insulin dose is 0. 
x If the third sugar sample is greater than the 
second sample and the second sample is 
greater than the first one, and the difference 
between the third sample and the second 
one is smaller or equal than the difference 
between the second sample and the first 
one and the difference between the third 
and the second sample is smaller than 4, 
the insulin dose is the minimum value. 
x If the third sugar sample is greater than the 
second sample and the second sample is 
greater than the first one, and the 
difference between the third sample and 
the second one is smaller or equal than the 
difference between the second sample and 
the first one and the difference between 
the third and the second sample is greater 
than 4, the insulin dose is the quotient of 
the difference between the third and the 
second sample by 4.
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3. If the sugar level is greater than the 
maximum value, then: 
x If the third sugar sample is greater than the 
second sample and their difference is 
smaller than 4, the insulin dose is 0. 
x If the third sugar sample is greater than the 
second sample and their difference is 
greater than or equal to 4, the insulin dose 
is the quotient of dividing the difference 
between the third sample and the second 
sample by 4.
x If the third sugar sample is equal to the 
second sample, the insulin dose is 0.  
x If the third sugar sample is smaller than the 
second sample and the difference between 
the third sample and the second one is 
smaller or equal than the difference between 
the second sample and the first one, the 
insulin dose is 0. 
x If the third sugar sample is smaller than the 
second sample and the difference between 
the third sample and the second one is 
greater than the difference between the 
second sample and the first one, the 
insulin dose is the minimum value.
After specifying functional and nonfunctional 
requirements, we need to specify system hazards. 
Most of the hazard standards propose four hazard 
severity classes; catastrophic, critical, marginal, 
and negligible [12]. High level hazards for CIIP are 
shown in Table 3 according to this classification. 
The risk of each hazard can be determined using a 
combination of a digit and a letter which is shown 
in Table 4 [13]. 
FMEA is a technique used in combination of 
hazard analysis in the proposed approach. There 
are three FMEA classes: Structural FMEA used for 
hardware analysis, functional FMEA used for 
system functions analysis and Combined FMEA 
[13]. Structural FMEA worksheet and functional 
FMEA worksheet for CIIP are shown in Table 5 
and Table 6, respectively. These tables are 
updated in the next phases of this step. 
Safety requirements may be defined in terms of 
constraints, chains of events, time constraints, fault 
tolerance equipment and warning interfaces. Safety 
requirements are classified as pure safety 
requirements, significant safety requirements, system 
safety requirements, and safety constraints [11]. This 
classification for CIIP is explained in detail in the 
following section. Each requirement must be mapped 
to at least one row of FMEA worksheets. 
Hazard Severity
Power supply fault Critical 
Sampling equipment fault Critical 
Insulin dose computing fault Catastrophic 
Injection equipment fault Critical 
Table 3. High level hazard classification for CIIP [12 ]. 
Severity 
1. Catastrophic 
2. Critical 
3. Marginal 
4. Negligible 
Probability 
A. Frequent 
B. Probable 
C. Occasional 
D. Remote 
E. Improbable 
Table 4. Hazard risk factor 13. 
Pure safety requirements: 
x System has not to have a risk in 1A rate 
Safety significant requirements: 
x If power is lower than the min level, a low 
power message has to be shown to the user 
and sampling operation must be suspended 
until power recharging takes place (rows 1, 2 
from structural FMEA).
x Sampling equipment has to be tested 
automatically. Sampling operation must be 
stopped if this equipment does not work 
perfectly (row 3 from structural FMEA). 
x Injecting equipment has to be tested 
automatically. Injecting operation must be 
stopped if this equipment does not work 
perfectly (row 6 from structural FMEA). 
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x If the amount of insulin in the reservoir is 
smaller than the min insulin dose or 
specified injection dose, a low insulin 
message has to be shown to the user and 
injecting operation must be stopped (row 7 
from structural FMEA). 
x The amount of cumulative dose at the end of 
every 24 hours can be at most 25 doses (row 4 
from structural FMEA, medical rules). 
Safety system requirements: 
x An electricity-current evaluator system 
equipped with current sensor, backup battery, 
and LCD (rows 1, 2 from structural FMEA). 
x Insulin-level determinant system for insulin 
reservoir (row 7 from structural FMEA) 
x Warning equipment (rows 1, 2 from structural 
FMEA and rows 1, 2 from functional FMEA) 
Safety constraints:  
FMEA
System: CIIP                                                   Subsystem: -                                            
Mode/Phase: Operating
Component Failure mode Failure rate 
Failure 
reasons 
Suddenly 
effect 
System 
effect 
Detection
method
Current 
control Hazard 
Hazard 
risk
Recommended
action row
Power 
supply 
Failed
1.1 * 10-9 
(manufacture 
information)
Control 
circuit failed 
Electricity 
current 
disconnection
System 
downs 
Current
test 
Quality 
control
Sugar
level 
increasing
2B
Using from a 
current sensor 
with backup 
battery to warn 
user power 
supply is failed 
1
Energy 
decreasing
Not available Battery energy 
decreasing 
Electricity 
current 
decreasing 
System 
incorrect 
action 
Current
test _
Sugar
level 
increasing 
2B
Using from a 
current sensor 
with backup 
battery to warn 
user change 
the system 
battery
2
Sampling
subsystem Failed
5 * 10-4 
(manufacture 
information) 
Hardware 
fault
Not receiving 
sugar sample
Not 
computing 
and
injecting 
insulin 
dose 
Inspecting Quality control 
Sugar
level 
increasing 
2B Automatic test 3
Insulin dose 
computing
subsystem
Failed Not available Hardware fault
Not 
computing
insulin dose
Not 
injecting 
insulin 
dose 
System 
testing _
Sugar
level 
increasing 
2B _ 4
Computing
fault _
Hardware 
fault,
programming
fault
Not 
computing
insulin dose
Unsafe 
system 
behavior 
System 
testing 
Software 
testing 
Serious
hurt to 
patient 
1A Hard testing 5
Injecting 
subsystem 
Failed
5 * 10-4 
(manufacture 
information) 
Hardware 
fault
Not injecting 
insulin dose 
Not 
injecting 
insulin 
dose 
Inspection Quality control 
Sugar
level 
increasing 
2B Automatic test 6 
Not 
enough
insulin 
_
Not charging 
insulin 
reservoir 
Not injecting 
insulin dose
Not 
injecting 
insulin 
dose 
Resource 
inspection _
Sugar
level 
increasing 
2B
Using from a 
sensor to 
assess 
reservoir insulin 
level
7
Table 5. Worksheet of structural FMEA for CIIP. 
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Safety constraints obtained from recommended 
reaction in FMEA worksheet with runtime 
management tag are as follows: 
x A sampling operation must be finished at most 
10 seconds after sampling starts otherwise, a 
sampling failure message must be shown to the 
user and the system has to be turned off (row 1 
from functional FMEA). 
x An insulin injection is an atomic operation 
(row 2 from functional FMEA). 
x If the sugar level is low, the system must 
avoid injecting insulin to the patient’s blood 
(row 4 from functional FMEA). 
x Insulin dose for injection must not exceed the 
max dose (row 4 from functional FMEA). 
x Injecting operation must be finished at most 
30 seconds after sampling starts otherwise,
 an injection failure message must be shown 
to the user and system has to be turned off 
(row 2 from functional FMEA). 
Step two: After identifying safety requirements, we 
model the system such that it satisfies all safety 
requirements [14]. We proposed two system units: 
operation unit that interacts with the environment 
(the patient) directly, and control unit that controls 
and supports the operation unit. Figure 1 shows 
this interactive model. 
We use timed transition Petri-net as the formal 
method because of its tractable behavior and its 
support of time. In addition, we use Z [17] to 
specify textual and mathematical specifications as 
a complement for Petri-net. A Petri-net model 
includes places, tokens, arcs and transitions. Each 
transition associates with a condition which, when 
holds, causes tokens on the transition to move to 
the next place. A Petri-net model for logical 
behavior of CIIP is shown in Figure 2.  
All transitions in Figure 2 are explained in Table 7 
similar to the proposed model in [8]. 
FMEA
System: CIIP                                                   Subsystem: -                                                  
Mode/Phase: Operating
Function Failure mode
Failure 
rate 
Failure 
reasons 
Suddenly 
effect 
System 
effects 
Detection
method
Current 
control Hazard 
Hazard 
risk 
Recommended
action Row
Sampling Not happening 
Not 
available 
Hardware 
fault,
software 
fault
Not 
receiving 
sample 
Nor
computing
nor
injecting 
insulin 
Not 
resetting 
new 
sample 
_
Face to 
unsafe 
status 
2B
Warn to user 
after 10 second 
(runtime safety 
management) 
1
Insulin 
injecting 
Not 
happening 
Not 
available 
Insulin 
reservoir 
is empty, 
hardware 
fault,
software 
fault
Not 
injecting 
insulin 
Injecting 
incorrect 
dose in 
the next 
injection 
Not 
resetting 
new 
sample 
_
Increasing 
sugar 
level 
2B
Warn the user 
after 30 second 
(runtime safety 
management) 
2
Injecting 
lower 
dose than 
specified 
Not 
available 
leakage of 
insulin in 
reservoir, 
hardware 
fault,
software 
fault
_
Injecting 
incorrect 
dose in 
the next 
injection 
_ _
Increasing 
sugar 
level 
2B
Transactional 
injecting 
(runtime safety 
management) 
3
Injecting 
higher
dose than 
specified 
Not 
available 
Hardware 
fault,
software 
fault
_
Injecting 
incorrect 
dose in 
the next 
injection 
_ _
Patient 
going to a 
coma 
1A
Daily injection 
control, hard 
testing, injection 
guards (runtime 
safety 
management) 
4
Table 6. Worksheet of functional FMEA for CIIP. 
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Transition Events or conditions
T1  Sugar > SafeMax
T2 Sugar <= SafeMax
T3  Sugar < SafeMin
T4  Sugar >= SafeMin
T5  Time >= 10
T6  E1: EndSampling
T7  Time >= 10
T8  E1: EndSampling
T9  Time >= 10
T10  E1: EndSampling
T11  Time >= 10
T12  E1: EndSampling
T13 E2: EndComputing
T14  E3: EndInjecting
T15
Insulin < MinDose Or Insulin < 
ComputedDose OR Charge < 
MinCharge
T16
Insulin >= MinDose AND Insulin >= 
ComputedDose AND Charge >= 
MinCharge
T17  Charge < MinCharge
T18  Charge >= MinCharge 
T19  Insulin < MinDose
T20  Insulin >= MinDose
Table 7. Transitions on the CIIP Petri-net model. 
As shown in Figure 2, the operation unit has four 
main states; Idle, Sampling, Computing, and 
Injecting. A token moves from Idle state to Injecting
state when transitions are fired according to the 
conditions in Table 7. Diagrams are not convenient 
tools to specify the requirements; instead, we use Z 
as a textual formal method to do so. Schemas 1 to 6 
specify CIIP requirements similar to [8]. Each schema 
has a declaration part and a predicate part. For 
example schema 1 specifies states and their initial 
values. In this schema, insulinAvailable shows the 
available insulin in the reservoir. Also this schema 
has a predicate minimumDose that specifies the 
amount of minimum insulin for injection. 
the sugar level is high and low, respectively. Last 
three schemas specify computing state in the Petri-
net model. Because the lack of space, we Schema 
2 specifies the behavior of the system when 
running. Schema 3, specifies data requirements 
when the sugar level is normal. Schemas 4 and 5 
specify data requirements when the sugar level is 
high and low, respectively. Last three schemas 
specify computing state in the Petri-net model. 
Because the lack of space, we ignore schemas for 
other states including sampling and injecting.  
Figure 1. The proposed interactive model for CIIP. 

Sampling 
equipments
Injecting 
equipments
Warning 
equipments
Insulin 
resources
Power 
supply 
equipments
Central 
computer
Environment (patient) Operation unit Control unit
Insulin/Warning
Sample Data
Process

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Figure 2. A Petri-net for logical behavior of CIIP 
Environment (patient)             Operation unit             Control unit 
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EMERGENCY 
PUBLIC_STATES 
insulinAvailable : N     // amount of insulin in the reservoir 
computedDose : N     // amount of computed insulin dose
cumulativeDose : N     // sum of insulin doses that were injected in current day 
injectionDose : N     // amount of insulin dose that must be injected 
safeMin : N     // one limit more or less than it means blood sugar is low
safeMax : N     // one limit bigger than it means blood sugar is high
maxDailyDose : N      // maximum insulin dose is legal to be injected in one day
maxSingleDose : N     // maximum insulin dose is legal to be injected in a ten-minute cycle
minimumDose : N     // minimum insulin dose can be injected
first_sample, second_sample, third_sample : N     // three last blood sugar of diabetic
charge : {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}     // amount of the power charge
minCharge : {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}     // minimum allowed amount of the power charge
warningAlarm1! : {on, off}     // to show a power warning to the diabetic 
warningAlarm2! : {on, off}     // to show a insulin warning to the diabetic
message1! : string     // showing a warning about power charge
message2! : string     // showing a warning about available insulin in the reservoir
systemStatus : { run, standby}     // status of system running 
systemState : {sampling, computing, injecting, sendingMessage}     // states of system  
clock? : TIME      //inputted time 
clock! TIME      //outputted time 
// configuration parameters
minimumDose = 1 
safeMin = 6 
safeMax = 14 
maxDailyDose = 25 
maxSingleDose = 4 
minCharge = 2 
Schema 1. Specification of public states for CIIP in the Z language. 
RUNNING 
ƸPUBLIC_STATES 
clock? = 001000 Î (clock! = 000000) ġ (injectionDose' = 0) ġ (computedDose' = 0) ġ (first_sample' = 
second_sample) ġ (second _sample' = third_sample) ġ (third _sample' = 0) 
systemStatus = run Ģ standby 
// dose of insulin is computed depending on the blood sugar level
SUGAR_NORMAL Ģ SUGAR_HIGH Ģ SUGAR_LOW
// safety rules
SAFETY 
cumulativeDose' = cumulativeDose + injectionDose 
Schema 2. Specification of runtime CIIP behavior in the Z language. 
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SUGAR_NORMAL 
systemStatus = run 
systemState = Computing 
(third_sample >= safeMin) ġ (third_sample <= safeMax) 
// sugar level stable or falling 
(third_sample <= second_sample) Î(computedDose = 0) 
// sugar level increases but rate of increase falls
(third_sample > second_sample) ġ(third_sample - second_sample) < (second_sample – first_sample) 
Î(computedDose = 0) 
// sugar level increases and rate of increase increases compute dose
// a minimum dose must be delivered if rounded to zero
(third_sample > second_sample) ġ(third_sample - second_sample) >= (second_sample – first_sample) 
ġ(round((third_sample - second_sample)/4) = 0) Î(computedDose = minimumDose) 
(third_sample > second_sample) ġ(third_sample - second_sample) >= (second_sample – first_sample) 
ġ(round((third_sample - second_sample)/4) > 0) Î(computedDose = round((third_sample - 
second_sample)/4)) 
Schema 3. Specification of CIIP behavior in the Z language when sugar is in normal level. 
SUGAR_HIGH 
S ystemStatus = run 
systemState = Computing 
third_sample > safeMax 
// sugar level increasing. Round down if below 1 unit 
(third_sample > second_sample) ġ(round((third_sample - second_sample)/4) = 0) Î(computedDose = 
minimumDose) 
(third_sample > second_sample) ġ(round((third_sample - second_sample)/4) > 0) Î(computedDose = 
round((third_sample - second_sample)/4)) 
// sugarlevel stable 
(third_sample = second_sample) Î(computedDose = minimumDose) 
// sugar level falling and rate of increase decreasing 
(third_sample < second_sample) ġ(third_sample - second_sample) <= (second_sample – first_sample) 
Î(computedDose = 0) 
// sugar level falling and rate of increase increasing 
(third_sample < second_sample) ġ(third_sample - second_sample) > (second_sample – first_sample) 
Î(computedDose = minimumDose) 
Schema 4. Specification of CIIP behavior in the Z language when sugar is in high level. 
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SUGAR_LOW 
systemStatus = run 
systemState = Computing 
third_sample < safeMin 
computedDose = 0 
warningAlarm! = on 
message! = "Your sugar is very low. Please call your doctor." 
Schema 5. Specification of CIIP behavior in the Z language when sugar is in low level. 
SAFETY 
charge < minCharge Î (warningAlarm1! = on) ġ (message1! = "Low charge.") ġ (systemStatus = standby) 
charge >= minCharge Î (warningAlarm1! = off) ġ (message1! = "") ġ (systemStatus = run) 
(insulinAvailable < minDose ) Ģ (insulinAvailable < injectionDose) Î  (warningAlarm2! = on) ġ (message2! = 
"Low insulin.") ġ (systemStatus = standby) 
(insulinAvailable >= minDose ) ġ (insulinAvailable >= injectionDose) Î  (warningAlarm2! = off) ġ (message2! 
= '") ġ (systemStatus = run) 
cumulativeDose <= 25 Î injectionDose = computedDose 
cumulativeDose > 25 Î injectionDose = 0 
Schema 6. Specification of significant safety requirements for CIIP in the Z language. 
MONITOR 
ƸPUBLIC_STATES 
systemState = sampling Î clock? <= 000010 
systemState = injecting Î (injectionDose > 0) ġ (insulinAvailable >= injectionDose) ġ (charge >= 
minCharge) 
third_sample < safeMin Î injectionDose = 0 
injectionDose <= maxDose 
systemState = injecting Î clock? <= 000030 
Schema 7. Prevention management for CIIP in the Z language. 
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Step three: Even using the most sophisticated 
techniques for controlling the safety in both, 
requirements layer and design layer, it is always 
possible an unexpected error causes a system failure 
at runtime. Therefore, to avoid any system failure, we 
need to monitor the behavior of the system at runtime 
to identify and manage unexpected faults. In the 
proposed approach, all the main states of the system 
are monitored continuously in a structure which 
includes four units: Log management, change 
management, prevention management and disaster 
management which are based on information 
technology infrastructure library (ITIL) 20.  
Log management logs the main sates of the 
system when they change. As a result, all required 
states must be identified first. The main candidates 
for logging are those which changes may result in 
a critical behavior. Main critical behavior of CIIP is 
insulin injection; because incorrect insulin injection 
may hurt the patient seriously. Critical states that 
are in our concern shown in Table 8. These states 
must be logged. 
Because critical behavior of the system may 
change over time, we need a change management 
unit to confirm that the change is safe. This unit is 
constructed from the high level constraints of the 
system and the environment conditions. Before 
giving permission to any critical behavior, required 
states are obtained from log management to 
ensure that all of them are safe. Change 
management unit plays a role in design, similar to 
the role of exception management in programming. 
Table 9 shows change permissions for the 
beginning of injecting critical behavior of CIIP. We 
can extend this table for other critical behaviors of 
CIIP which are in the second level of importance. 
To detect existing faults of the system before entering 
to critical states at runtime, a prevention 
management is required. Because CIIP is a real-time 
system, it is better to design prevention management 
such that it runs in parallel with the system. Schema 
7 specifies prevention management in Z language for 
CIIP. When any condition in this schema fails, 
disaster management is called. 

Disaster management unit is a complement for the 
prevention unit. It tries to escape from faulty 
situations of the system, those which cannot be 
predicted in normal behavior and may lead to a 
catastrophic status. Disaster management can be 
as simple as showing a warning to the user, or as 
complex as replacing a redundant hardware, or as 
urgent as turning off the whole system. Disaster 
management for CIIP can be designed to turn off 
the system, show a message about system failure, 
and send a message to the patient's doctor 
through communication lines. Schema 8 specifies 
disaster management for CIIP in Z language. 
EMERGENCY 
ƸPUBLIC_STATES 
systemStatus = standby 
systemState = sendingMessage 
warnningAlarm1! – on 
warnningAlarm2! = on 
message1! = "System Failure" 
Schema 8. Disaster management for CIIP 
in the Z language. 
State
name Conception Log times Details 
Charge 
Power 
supply 
energy 
Every minute, 
after warning 
enabled or 
warning 
disabled 
_
insulinAva
ilable 
Available 
insulin in 
reservoir 
Every minute, 
after warning 
enabled or 
warning 
disabled 
_
computed
Dose
Computed 
dose 
Immediately 
after end of 
computing 
operation 
After the 
end of 
the
injecting 
operation 
the
amount 
of this log 
become 
zero
cumulativ
eDose 
Cumulative
dose 
Immediately 
after the end 
of  the 
injecting 
operation 
After
every 24 
hours,
the
amount 
of this log 
become 
zero
Table 8. Critical states of CIIP. 
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Critical 
behavior Conditions Permission 
Beginning
of the 
injecting 
operation 
Charge > minCharge AND 
insulinavailable > minDose 
AND ComputedDose > 0 
AND cumulativeDose <=25 
True 
~( Charge > minCharge AND 
insulinavailable > minDose 
AND ComputedDose > 0 
AND cumulativeDose <=25) 
False 
Table 9. Change permissions for critical behavior of CIIP 
4. Conclusions 
Achieving a high degree of safety in safety-critical 
software requires that designers think about it 
carefully in each step of the software production. 
However, current approaches usually focus on 
safety in only one phase of the software production. 
In this paper, we proposed a multi-phase approach 
to achieve safety in safety-critical software. To 
describe the behavior of the system formally, we 
used timed transition Petri-net and the Z language. 
To show the proposed approach practically, we 
used CIIP as a sample model. 
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